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INTRODUCTION 
 From the marginalization of Native Americans to the bitter rivalry be-
tween the North and the South, discrimination within the United States is 
not a new phenomenon. For centuries, Americans have discriminated 
against one another because they come from different parts of the country. 
Northerners have been derogatorily referred to as “Yankees,”1 Southerners2 
as “rednecks,”3 Appalachians as “hillbillies,”4 Californians as “hippies” and 
“Valley girls,”5 and Native Americans as “redskins.”6 Such discrimination has 
had particularly adverse consequences in the employment context due to the 
assumptions employers draw from these regional identities. For example, 
 
1 See, e.g., Lindsay E. Leonard, Damned Yankees: Restrictive Covenants That Discriminate 
Against Geographic Origin, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 671, 672-73 (2008) (describing a restrictive 
covenant that prohibited property from being leased or sold to anyone considered part of the 
“Yankee race”).  
2 See Stephen J. McNamee & Robert K. Miller, Jr., The Meritocracy Myth, SOCIATION TODAY, 
Spring 2004, available at http://www.ncsociology.org/sociationtoday/v21/merit.htm (describing 
“discrimination against Southerners and preference for Yankees” as a form of discrimination that 
neutralizes the effects of merit).  
3 See PHILIP MARTIN, THE ARTIFICIAL SOUTHERNER: EQUIVOCATIONS AND LOVE 
SONGS 34-35 (2001) (citing Reverend Will Campbell, who argues that “rednecks,” defined as poor 
rural white Southerners, “are the most discriminated-against folks in America”).  
4 See Everett Sizemore, Appalachian Americans: The Invisible Minority, YAHOO! VOICES (Aug. 
16, 2005), http://voices.yahoo.com/article/8611/appalachian-americans-invisible-minority-6422.html 
(“Appalachians are statistically one of the most exploited and marginalised groups in America.”).  
5 See Mary Bucholtz et al., Hella Nor Cal or Totally So Cal?: The Perceptual Dialectology of Cali-
fornia, 35 J. ENG. LINGUISTICS 325, 326-27 (2007) (explaining that people typically associate the 
“Valley girl” stereotype with “vacuous, silly, airheaded, [and] California” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
6 See Rob Capriccioso, ‘Redskins’ May Have Psychological Impact Beyond Native Americans, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (May 19, 2010), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ 
article/%25e2%2580%2598redskins%25e2%2580%2599-may-have-psychological-impact-beyond-native- 
americans-22498 (explaining that “[s]ocial science research shows that the use of ethnic slurs like 
‘redskin’ perpetuates harmful stereotypes and leads to discrimination” against Native Americans). 
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Southerners are frequently seen as less competent, intelligent, and educated,7 
which in turn impacts hiring and firing and contributes to a hostile work 
environment. 
Despite the prevalence of regional animus in the United States, employ-
ment discrimination based on regional origin is not currently actionable 
under Title VII’s national origin provision.8 Rather, most courts have 
interpreted Title VII’s national origin provision narrowly, requiring employees 
to point to a sovereign country of origin in order to make out a national 
origin discrimination claim. The problem with this country-focused concep-
tion of national origin is that it presupposes that nations are homogeneous 
when, in reality, nations—especially large ones like the United States—are 
composed of divergent subgroups. 
Given this problem, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) and some courts have begun to broaden the definition of national 
origin to include “place of origin.” They have done so in order to move away 
from the misguided assumption that sovereignty is required to constitute a 
“national origin.” As a result, courts have upheld discrimination claims 
where employees traced their national origin to subnational groups in 
foreign countries, such as Acadians, Creoles, and Gypsies, as well as Serbians 
as part of the former Yugoslavia. However, courts have refused to allow 
employees to prove discrimination under Title VII by tracing their national 
origin to regions or subnational groups within the United States. Instead, 
courts have continued to treat “American” as though it were a homogeneous 
national origin. 
To better protect employees from employment discrimination, Title 
VII’s national origin provision should be taken one step further to include 
 
7 Kayla Elizabeth Anders, The Effects of Dialect, Gender, and Group Identity on Person 
Perception (Apr. 24, 2009) (unpublished B.A. thesis, The College of William and Mary), available 
at https://digitalarchive.wm.edu/bitstream/handle/10288/1161/Kayla%20Anders%2c%20Honors%20 
Thesis%20%282009%29.pdf?sequence=1; see also Jason K. Clark, Cassie A. Eno & Rosanna E. 
Guadagno, Southern Discomfort: The Effects of Stereotype Threat on the Intellectual Performance of US 
Southerners, 10 SELF & IDENTITY 248, 249, 257-59 (2011), available at http://osil.psy.ua.edu/ 
pubs/Clark%20et%20al%202011%20-%20Southern%20Discomfort.pdf (studying how negative 
stereotypes of “southerners as being uneducated and unintelligent” can impact southern students’ 
academic performance); Paul Jankowski, Six Ignorant Stereotypes About Middle America, FORBES 
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/pauljankowski/2011/10/05/six-ignorant-stereotypes-
about-middle-america (explaining that the six most ignorant stereotypes about citizens in “the 
New Heartland” is that they are dumb, fat, poor, backward, and conservative, and only like 
country music); American Regions & Stereotypes, ENGLISH REPUBLIC, http://englishrepublic.ru/ 
Topics/AmericanRegions.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (“Americans from other parts of the 
United States characterize residents of the Deep South as unintelligent, simple, uncultured, and 
intolerant . . . .”).  
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
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regional discrimination within the United States. The burden of proof 
should be on the plaintiff to show that she comes from a region of the 
United States with a distinct culture, history, and background. This interpre-
tation would permit Title VII to protect against discrimination occurring 
among individuals sharing the same American origin, while keeping national 
origin within geographically circumscribed limits.  
Part I of this Comment defines national origin under Title VII and de-
scribes how an employee may bring a national origin discrimination claim. 
Part II critiques the assumption underlying Title VII’s national origin 
definition—that nations are homogeneous—by describing the various forms 
of employment discrimination that occur within the United States. Part III 
summarizes the relevant case law to show that courts have gradually expand-
ed the scope of national origin discrimination protection to encompass some 
forms of subnational discrimination, but notes that courts have failed to do 
so uniformly. Finally, Part IV critiques recent proposals to amend Title VII 
and recommends that Title VII’s national origin provision be reinterpreted 
to include regional discrimination. 
I. NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION  
UNDER TITLE VII 
A. Definition of “National Origin” 
The key federal law prohibiting discrimination in employment is Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9 Title VII applies to all public and 
private employers with fifteen or more employees10 and prohibits employers 
from discriminating on the basis of an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.11 
Although national origin is among the types of discrimination prohibited 
by Title VII, national origin discrimination was not the primary evil the 
authors of Title VII intended to combat. Rather, Congress’s main goal was 
to prohibit the rampant racial discrimination that had been plaguing African 
Americans in the United States for over a century.12 The only reason 
 
9 Id. 
10 Id. § 2000e(b). 
11 Id. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin . . . .”). 
12 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The language of 
Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and 
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national origin was ultimately included as a protected class was “because it 
was part of the ‘boilerplate’ statutory language of fair employment in 
executive orders and legislation preceding the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”13 
The fact that Title VII fails to define national origin underscores the 
relative unimportance of national origin discrimination in the minds of the 
statute’s authors.14 The only semblance of a definition discernible from the 
limited legislative history is a statement by Congressman James Roosevelt 
of California, in which he explained, “‘[N]ational origin’ means national. It 
means the country from which you or your forebears came from. You may 
come from Poland, Czechoslovakia, England, France, or any other country.”15 
Further, in the fifty years since Title VII’s enactment, the Supreme 
Court has only once interpreted the “national origin” provision directly.16 In 
Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., the Court held that “[t]he term ‘national 
origin’ on its face refers to the country where a person was born, or, more 
broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came.”17 As is evident 
from both the legislative history behind Title VII’s national origin provision 
and the sole Supreme Court case interpreting it, “national origin”—at least 
at the beginning—was interpreted literally to refer to a specific country. 
B. Proving a National Origin Discrimination Claim 
An employee seeking to bring a national origin discrimination claim 
under Title VII may do so in one of two ways: as a disparate treatment 
claim or as a disparate impact claim. 
1. Disparate Treatment 
A claim of disparate treatment based on national origin arises when an 
employer treats an employee differently from the employee’s coworkers 
 
to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job 
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.”). 
13 Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination Under 
Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 807 (1994). 
14 Joanna Carey Smith, Emerging Issues: National Origin Discrimination in Employment, POPU-
LAR GOV’T, Fall 2002, at 17, 18, available at http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pg/pgfal02/ 
article2.pdf.  
15 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964); see also Eugenio Abellera Cruz, Note, Unprotected Identities: 
Recognizing Cultural Ethnic Divergence in Interpreting Title VII’s ‘National Origin’ Classification, 9 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 161, 177-78 (1998). 
16 Perea, supra note 13, at 822. 
17 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973), superseded by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (1996), as recognized in Cor-
tezano v. Salin Bank & Trust Co., 680 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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because of the employee’s national origin.18 Intentional discrimination is the 
cornerstone of a disparate treatment claim. Examples of intentional national 
origin discrimination abound in the United States, particularly in the 
aftermath of September 11th. For example, in Hassan v. City of Ithaca, the 
plaintiff—who identified himself as being of “Middle Eastern descent”—
alleged that after September 11, 2001, his employer began disparaging him 
because of his national origin, calling him and other individuals of Middle 
Eastern descent names such as “sand nigger,” “dune coon,” and “towel 
head.”19 The plaintiff also claimed that he received far harsher disciplinary 
penalties than non-Middle Eastern employees, even for conduct that had 
occurred more than a year before.20 Ultimately, the plaintiff was fired.21 This 
case—and other cases like it22—constitutes disparate treatment because the 
adverse employment actions in question were taken “because of ” the 
employee’s national origin.23 
A plaintiff may advance a disparate treatment claim under either a single- or 
a mixed-motive theory. Under a single-motive theory, the plaintiff must 
show that unlawful discrimination alone was the reason for the adverse 
employment actions, following the burden-shifting framework set forth by 
the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.24 Initially, a plaintiff 
bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima 
facie case of discrimination.25 In the context of hiring, for example, a plaintiff 
 
18 See Smith, supra note 14, at 20 (describing the various claims that courts recognize under 
Title VII). 
19 No. 10-06125, 2012 WL 1190649, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2012). 
20 Id. at *2-3. 
21 Id. at *2. 
22 See, e.g., EEOC v. Spitzer Mgmt., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 2d 851, 863-64 (N.D. Ohio 2012) 
(holding that statements made after September 11th, referring to plaintiff as “Chemical Ali,” 
“Camel Jockey,” and “Little Terrorist,” were sufficiently severe and pervasive to support a claim of 
hostile work environment and constructive discharge); Alawi v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 544 F. Supp. 
2d 1171, 1178-79 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (upholding plaintiff ’s national origin discrimination claim 
where the employer inquired about plaintiff ’s Middle Eastern origin and opinion of jihad); Elries 
v. Denny’s, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 590, 594, 598 (D. Md. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff estab-
lished a prima facie case of national origin discrimination based on evidence that the employer 
assigned the plaintiff irregular hours, prohibited the plaintiff from speaking Arabic, ordered the 
plaintiff to sit in the back of the room, stated he planned to “get rid of all the Arabs,” and, 
ultimately, terminated the plaintiff ). 
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (describing that it is an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to discriminate against an individual “because of such individual’s . . . national 
origin” (emphasis added)). 
24 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); see also McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing the elements of a disparate treatment 
claim and the burdens of proof required of the parties when litigating such a claim). 
25 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
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could meet this burden by showing (1) that she fell within a recognized 
national origin; (2) that she applied for and was qualified for a job for which 
the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite her qualifications, she 
was rejected; and (4) that the employer continued to seek equally qualified 
applicants or filled the position with someone outside of the plaintiff ’s 
national origin group.26 Successfully establishing the prima facie case gives 
rise to an inference of discrimination. 
In order to rebut the inference of discrimination, the burden then shifts 
to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
adverse employment action.27 The defendant need not persuade the court 
that she was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. Rather, “[i]t is 
sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether [she] discriminated against the plaintiff.”28 
Finally, should the defendant succeed in articulating a legitimate reason 
for her actions, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant 
were not genuine and were merely a pretext for discrimination.29 
Despite the clarity of the McDonnell Douglas framework, employment 
decisions are rarely made on the basis of a single factor. Rather, “most 
employment decisions are the result of the interaction of various factors, 
legitimate and at times illegitimate, objective and subjective, rational and 
irrational.”30 Recognizing that employment decisions are complex, Congress 
amended Title VII in 1991 to allow for a mixed-motive theory for a disparate 
treatment claim, providing that “an unlawful employment practice is 
established when [a plaintiff ] demonstrates that . . . national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.”31 The Supreme Court interpreted the amended 
statute in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa and found that a plaintiff need not 
provide direct evidence of discrimination in pursuing a claim under a 
mixed-motive theory, explaining that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is not only 
sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than 
direct evidence.”32 
 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 802-03. 
28 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. 
29 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
30 Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (D. Minn. 2003).  
31 Act of Nov. 21, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 107(a), § 703, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (emphasis 
added) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)). 
32 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n. 17 
(1957)).  
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Although the mixed-motive analysis gives plaintiffs more flexibility in 
developing a claim against a discriminatory employer who may have been 
motivated by factors other than national origin, this flexibility comes at a 
cost: in mixed-motive cases, Title VII affords employers a limited affirma-
tive defense. If an employer can “demonstrat[e] that [she] would have taken 
the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,” the 
jury may limit a plaintiff ’s remedies to certain types of injunctive relief and 
attorney’s fees.33 
2. Disparate Impact 
Unlike disparate treatment claims, disparate impact claims do not require 
proof of a discriminatory motive.34 Rather, disparate impact claims arise 
from employment practices that are “facially neutral in their treatment of 
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than 
another.”35 A plaintiff bringing a disparate impact claim grounded in 
national origin discrimination need only show that a particular employment 
practice, though ostensibly neutral on its face, had a discriminatory effect on 
employees of a particular national origin.36 The burden of proof then shifts 
to the employer to demonstrate that the employment practice did not have a 
disparate impact or, if it did, that the practice was “job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity.”37 Should the 
defendant meet this burden, a plaintiff could then prevail only “by showing 
there is a less discriminatory alternative.”38  
A familiar example of disparate impact discrimination involves the use 
of standardized tests.39 For instance, in Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., the employer 
instituted an English-only proficiency test for his employees, even though 
many employees had limited English language skills.40 Although the 
employer did not intend to discriminate, the proficiency tests were still 
 
33 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).  
34 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n. 15 (1977). 
35 Id.  
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).  
37 Id.  
38 EEOC v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Firefighters’ Inst. for Racial 
Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 220 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000)).  
39 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (invalidating the employer’s 
use of cognitive tests on the grounds that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but 
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. . . . If an employment practice 
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice 
is prohibited . . . .”).  
40 701 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1142 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
  
2014] The Divided States of America 657 
 
actionable under Title VII because the tests had a discriminatory effect on 
employees of Hispanic national origins.41  
II. TITLE VII’S FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR  
SUBNATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
Under Espinoza’s definition of “national origin” as country of ancestry,42 
plaintiffs must trace their ethnicity to a sovereign country in order to 
prevail on a national origin discrimination claim. This definition is not 
sufficient today, as the American workforce has grown more and more 
ethnically diverse.43 First, the traditional definition of national origin 
erroneously assumes that nations are homogeneous when, in reality, “even 
the most seemingly homogeneous ethnic grouping contains cultural sub-
groups.”44 Second, and related to the first point, the traditional definition 
fails to account for the incidence of subnational discrimination that continues 
to occur within the United States. As a result, the courts and the EEOC 
have interpreted national origin more and more broadly, stopping just short 
of a full recognition of subnational discrimination.  
A. Title VII’s Flawed Assumption of  
Intracountry Homogeneity 
Nations are not homogeneous. Rather, most nations are comprised of a 
variety of subgroups, each with differing ethnicities. These ethnicities are 
characterized by “shared mutable and immutable qualities given at birth 
such as race, national origin, ancestry, mother language, religion, shared 
history, traditions, values, and symbols, all of which contribute to a sense of 
 
41 See id. at 1142-43 (explaining that although the national origin claims raised in this case 
were ultimately unsuccessful, the use of the discriminatory tests by the employer had the potential 
to result in the termination of foreign-language speaking employees). 
42 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
43 See, e.g., Press Release, United States Census Bureau, An Older and More Diverse Nation 
by Midcentury, CB 08-123 (Aug. 14, 2008), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/ 
releases/archives/population/cb08-123.html (“Minorities, now roughly one-third of the U.S. 
population, are expected to become the majority in 2042, with the nation projected to be 54 
percent minority in 2050.”); see also Troy D. Thompson, Meltdown in the Melting Pot: The Growth of 
National Origin Claims, WIS. EMP. L. LETTER, Mar. 2004 (explaining that in 2002, the EEOC 
“received 9,042 charges involving national origin discrimination—a 27 percent increase since 1999” 
and that “those claims have remained on the rise”); D.D. Bennett-Alexander & L.P. Hartman, 
National Origin Discrimination, MCGRAW-HILL ANSWERS, http://answers.mheducation.com/ 
management/employment-law/national-origin-discrimination (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (explaining 
that “complaints to the EEOC based on alleged national origin discrimination . . . represent the 
fastest-growing source of complaints submitted to the EEOC”).  
44 Cruz, supra note 15, at 164. 
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distinctiveness both for members of the group and for outsiders.”45 Often, 
these groups are united by a shared interpretation of their subgroup’s 
particular history within the country in which they reside.46  
Despite the differences that exist within nations, as originally defined, 
national origin represents a singular, uniform identity—an identity that 
each individual country possesses and that is shared by all of the country’s 
citizens. The problem with the traditional definition of “national origin” is 
that it “fails to recognize the cultural differences [that exist] among people 
who share the same geographic origin and/or ancestry.”47 Yet, it is these 
intracountry differences that have historically resulted in invidious forms of 
discrimination.  
Examples of intracountry conflict abound in history. One of the most 
prominent examples of such subnational tension was the tragic genocide in 
Rwanda. In 1994, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were killed within the 
short span of 100 days.48 The violence was a result of historical tension 
between the country’s ethnic majority Hutus and minority Tutsis.49 Although 
the two groups “speak the same language, inhabit the same areas and follow 
the same traditions,” Tutsis are often distinguishable by height and build 
from Hutus.50 Further, when Belgian colonists occupied Rwanda in the early 
twentieth century, they classified Rwandans by ethnicity and considered 
Tutsis to be the superior group.51 As a result, for almost twenty years, Tutsis 
“enjoyed better jobs and educational opportunities.”52 
Imagine now that there are two American citizens of Rwandan ancestry 
working for the same employer. One employee is Tutsi and the other 
employee is Hutu. Their employer consistently harasses and verbally abuses 
the Hutu employee simply because of her Hutu ancestry, and the Hutu 
employee is passed up for a promotion that a less qualified Tutsi employee 
receives. Regardless of the invidiousness of the discrimination against the 
 
45 Id. at 168.  
46 See Charles F. Keyes, The Dialectics of Ethnic Change, in ETHNIC CHANGE 4, 8 (Charles F. 
Keyes ed., 1981) (“What cultural characteristics are marked as emblematic of ethnic identity 
depends upon the interpretations of the experiences and actions of mythical ancestors and/or 
historical forebears. These interpretations are often presented in the form of myths or legends in 
which historical events have been accorded symbolic significance.”). 
47 Cruz, supra note 15, at 178. 
48 See Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
1288230.stm (last updated Dec. 18, 2008) (detailing the origins and aftermath of the Rwandan 
genocide).  
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
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Hutu employee, she likely could not prevail on a claim of national origin 
discrimination. Rather, under Espinoza’s narrow definition of national 
origin, the promoted Tutsi employee and the passed-over Hutu employee 
would be deemed to share the same Rwandan national origin. Because Title 
VII only considers “Rwandan,” and not “Hutu,” as a national origin, the 
Hutu employee would likely struggle to prove that the employer discrimi-
nated against her as a Hutu Rwandan where the employer consistently 
promoted Tutsi Rwandans. Even where an employer showed a clear discrim-
inatory animus against Hutus, the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis 
disappears for Title VII analysis, and both would be considered “Rwandans.”  
Similar subnational discrimination based primarily on regional origin 
also occurred in Sudan. Since Sudan gained its independence in 1956, 
“[m]ore than 2 million people have been killed . . . in the long-running war 
between successive governments of the north and peoples of the south.”53 In 
2003, regional tension flared in Darfur, a region in western Sudan, leading 
to government-sanctioned attacks on Muslim nomads and farmers.54 Darfur, 
while predominantly Muslim, includes “more than 30 ethnic groups.”55 
Tension in Darfur quickly “assumed an increasingly ethnic and racist 
dimension, with population groups defining themselves as Arab or Zurq.”56 
As a result of these intracountry differences, over 400,000 citizens living in 
Darfur died and over 2,500,000 were displaced.57 Thus, even though the 
citizens shared the same Sudanese national origin, discrimination persisted 
within the country’s regional subgroups, culminating in the death of 
hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. 
Rwanda and Darfur are only two particularly egregious cases of subna-
tional discrimination; other examples abound in history.58 According to one 
 
53 See Salih Booker & Ann-Louise Colgan, Genocide in Darfur, NATION, July 12, 2004, at 8, 8 
(describing the historical tension between ethnic groups in Sudan and Western inaction to prevent 
genocide there). 
54 See Genocide in Darfur, UNITED HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/ 
genocide/genocide-in-sudan.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (providing context for the religious 
and ethnic strife in Darfur). 
55 Tim Youngs, House of Commons Library, Research Paper 04/51: Sudan: Conflict in Darfur 7 
( June 23, 2004), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2004/ 
rp04-051.pdf.  
56 Id. at 8. 
57 Genocide in Darfur, supra note 54.  
58 See, e.g., Al Burke, Genocide Victims Accused of Genocide, NORDIC NEWS NETWORK ( Jan. 
16, 2004), http://www.nnn.se/n-model/foreign/hmong.htm (describing a debate surrounding the 
Laotian government’s genocide of the country’s Hmong ethnic minority); Dave Johns, The Crimes 
of Saddam Hussein: 1988 The Anfal Campaign, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/ 
stories/iraq501/events_anfal.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (describing Saddam Hussein’s 
campaign to eradicate the Kurdish population of northern Iraq); Myanmar/Burma, GENOCIDE 
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study, there have been “no less than 58 ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 
1999, constituting 51% of the total number of civil wars.”59 These examples 
demonstrate that an interpretation of national origin that is based solely on 
country of origin “ignore[s] the reality of ethnicity—which can encompass 
race, religion, language, culture and other characteristics in formation of 
personal and group identity.”60 These subnational “[d]ifferences in dress, 
language, accent, and custom” are often “more likely to elicit prejudicial 
attitudes than the fact of the [national] origin itself.”61 Yet, because of the 
definition of national origin set forth in Espinoza, an employee would 
probably fail in relying on such subnational differences to support a national 
origin discrimination claim.  
B. Prevalence of Subnational Discrimination  
Within the United States 
The prevalence of subnational discrimination is not unique to employees 
who trace their national origins to subgroups within countries other than 
the United States—it is also a problem within the United States. According 
to one scholar, America is inherently divided because “the United States is a 
federation comprised of the whole or part of eleven regional nations, some 
of which truly do not see eye to eye with one another . . . and [f]ew [of 
which] have shown any indication that they are melting into some sort of 
unified American culture.”62 These eleven American subnations can be 
divided along geographic lines, each with its own history, common culture, 
and set of assumptions about politics and life.63 As a result, “[i]t is fruitless 
 
WATCH, http://www.genocidewatch.org/myanmar.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (collecting 
various news articles detailing ethnic discrimination against the Rohingya, an ethnic minority 
living in western Myanmar); Brett Stone, Genocide in Australia: Report Details Crimes Against 
Aborigines, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Sept. 7, 1999), http://www.wsws.org/articles/ 
1999/sep1999/geno-s07.shtml (describing the genocidal practices perpetrated for centuries against 
Australian Aboriginals). 
59 Francesco Caselli & Wilbur John Coleman II, On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict, 11 J. EUR. 
ECON. ASS’N 161, 162 (Supp. 2013).  
60 Cruz, supra note 15, at 164. 
61 Stephen M. Cutler, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 
YALE L.J. 1164, 1165 (1985). 
62 COLIN WOODARD, AMERICAN NATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE ELEVEN RIVAL REGIONAL 
CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA 3 (2011); see also American Regions & Stereotypes, supra note 7 
(explaining that the United States can be broken up into six unofficial regions—New England, the 
Mid-Atlantic, the South, the Midwest, the Southwest, and the West—and describing the 
stereotypes of Americans who live in these regions).  
63 WOODARD, supra note 62, at 3. In Colin Woodard’s theory, North America has long been 
divided into eleven rival, regional subnations. Id. Some of the divisions that Woodard cites are 
based on the very stereotypes that serve as sources of subnational discrimination within the 
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to search for the characteristics of an ‘American’ identity, because each 
nation [within the United States] has its own notion of what being Ameri-
can should mean.”64 Regardless of whether one divides the United States 
into eleven subnations or otherwise, regional differences exist and many 
cases of employment discrimination stem from these differences.  
The most obvious example of subnational discrimination within the 
United States is the historic rivalry between the North and the South. From 
clashes over slavery to a brutal civil war, the southern region of the United 
States has long had a distinct identity.65 The differences between the North 
 
United States. The first regional nation, “Yankeedom,” stretches from Puritan New England to 
upstate New York and parts of the upper Midwest. Id. at 5. This nation has been “locked in nearly 
perpetual combat with the Deep South for control of the federal government since the moment 
such a thing existed.” Id. The second regional nation, “New Netherland,” encompasses what is now 
Greater New York City and is notable for being multi-ethnic and for caring more about money 
than Yankee moralizing. Id. at 6. The third regional nation, “the Midlands”—the “most ‘American’ 
of the nations”—was founded by Quakers and stretches from Philadelphia across the heart of the 
Midwest. Id. at 6-7. The fourth regional nation, “Tidewater,” is a fundamentally conservative 
region that spans the lowlands of Virginia, Maryland, southern Delaware, and northeastern North 
Carolina. Id. at 7. The fifth regional nation, “Greater Appalachia,” includes the southern Midwest 
and upper South. Id. at 8. Appalachia is known for its “combative culture” and deep aversion 
towards “Yankee teachers, Tidewater lords, and Deep Southern aristocrats.” Id. The sixth regional 
nation, the “Deep South,” spans the southern lowlands and has long “been the bastion of white 
supremacy, aristocratic privilege, and a version of classical Republicanism modeled on the slave 
states of the ancient world.” Id. at 9. The seventh regional nation, “New France,” covers Quebec 
and the Acadian enclaves of southern Louisiana. Id. at 9-10. The eighth regional nation, “El 
Norte,” spans the U.S.–Mexico border and is dominated by Hispanic language, culture, and social 
norms. Id. at 10. The ninth regional nation, “the Left Coast,” located “between the Pacific and the 
Cascade and Coast mountain ranges, . . . combines the Yankee faith in good government and social 
reform with a commitment to individual self-exploration and discovery.” Id. at 11. The tenth 
regional nation, “the Far West,” includes the entire interior west of the one-hundredth meridian 
and, due to oppressive environmental conditions, has remained in a state of semi-dependency. Id. 
at 12. Finally, the last regional nation, “First Nation,” is occupied by indigenous inhabitants, 
including Native Americans, most of whom have never given up their land by treaty and who “still 
retain cultural practices and knowledge that allow them to survive in the region on its own terms.” 
Id. at 13.  
64 Id. at 261. The fact that subnational differences exist within the United States is also ap-
parent by the disagreement among courts as to whether “American” constitutes a valid national 
origin in the first place. Compare Vicedomini v. Alitalia Airlines, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 
1381, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (rejecting the notion that “American” constitutes a national origin under 
Title VII and stating that “perhaps” the only group that may claim an “American” national origin 
is Native Americans), with Thomas v. Rohner-Gehrig & Co., 582 F. Supp. 669, 675 (N.D. Ill. 
1984) (“[E]mployment discrimination against American citizens based merely on country of birth, 
whether that birthplace is the United States or elsewhere . . . is sufficient to state a Title VII cause 
of action based on national origin discrimination.”). 
65 See JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY 1789–1861, at 4 
(1930) (“[T]he inhabitants of those states below the Mason and Dixon line always considered 
themselves a separate and distinct people . . . [a]nd it was this consciousness of unity—however 
  
  
662 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 649 
 
and the South are numerous. First, many Southerners66 share a unique 
history in the United States because their ancestors fought the North in the 
Civil War, seceded from the country, and operated their own government as 
the Confederate States of America. Further, on a cultural level, Southerners 
often place much greater emphasis on a “slow pace of life”67 and hold a 
dominant cultural position of “[o]pposition to modernism [and] liberal 
theology.”68 More so than citizens in any other region, Southerners “have 
been the stronghold of biblical inerrancy; the elimination of barriers 
between church and state; teaching children religious rather than scientific 
explanations for the origins and nature of the universe; maintaining legal, 
political, and social restraints against homosexuality, civil rights, and 
interracial dating; and of preventing the secularization of society.”69  
Based on these regional differences, in the twentieth century, many 
Southerners were discriminated against when seeking jobs in northern cities 
and forced to take jobs as semiskilled or unskilled laborers.70 Much of the 
employment discrimination that Southerners have faced stems from the fact 
that they are frequently associated with negative assessments of compe-
tence, intelligence, and education.71 For example, according to one study, 
 
justified—that obliterated state boundaries and consolidated a geographic section of the Union 
into a single people.”). 
66 Due to the complicated history of race relations in the South, I use the term “many South-
erners” to refer specifically to white Southerners who trace their heritage, at least in part, to the 
Civil War era. However, it is important to note that many aspects of the southern regional identity 
are shared among black Southerners and white Southerners. See Ashley Blaise Thompson, 
Southern Identity: The Meaning, Practice, and Importance of a Regional Identity 212 (Aug. 2007) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University), available at http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/ 
available/etd-07242007-162825/unrestricted/final3.pdf (finding that “[S]outherners, both black and 
white, appear to base their regional identity claims largely on birth in the region, family ancestry 
in the South, and life-long residence in the South,” but that this regional identity is “more relevant 
and familiar to whites in the region than blacks,” who emphasize their racial identity before their 
regional identity). 
67 Id. at 214. 
68 WOODARD, supra note 62, at 271.  
69 Id. 
70 See LEWIS M. KILLIAN, WHITE SOUTHERNERS 102-09 (Univ. of Mass. Press, rev. ed. 
1985) (using a case study of a “hillbilly” colony in mid-twentieth century Chicago to show that the 
phenomenon of the working class–white southern minority being stereotyped and discriminated 
against in the northern city is not new, and describing how these stereotypes have negatively 
impacted southerners’ job prospects).  
71 See Saumya Vaishampayan, When an Accent Gets in the Way of a Job, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 
2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/atwork/2012/09/06/when-an-accent-gets-in-the-way-of-a-job (outlining 
the role that accent plays in employment discrimination and explaining that southern accents 
consistently received lower ratings in the category of perceived intelligence); Anders, supra note 7; 
see also Thompson, supra note 66, at 29-30 (explaining that white Southerners in particular are 
seen by both northern whites and blacks as “poorer, lazier, less intelligent, more likely to live off 
welfare, and less patriotic” and that although “white southerners are not stereotyped to the same 
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employers in seven out of fourteen northern industrial plants “stated openly 
that they would hire white southern workers only when they could not get 
anybody else,” explaining that “laziness, lack of education and skills, and an 
overdeveloped spirit of independence made them undesirable as employ-
ees.”72 Another more recent study found that Southerners displaced by 
Hurricane Katrina had a hard time finding employment outside the South.73 
As one job applicant who sought employment in Colorado explained, 
employers “treated her like she was ‘stupid’ and ‘uneducated’ because of her 
Southern accent.”74 
Despite the employment discrimination that Southern-Americans face 
in the United States, a Southern-American employee would likely not have 
a cognizable claim solely on the basis of the discrimination she faced as a 
Southern-American. For example, imagine a Southern-American individual 
is not hired and a less qualified Northern-American is hired. Because both 
the hired Northern-American and the not-hired Southern-American share 
the same “American” national origin, the Southern-American’s Title VII 
disparate treatment national origin claim would likely fail. In other words, 
employers are free to act upon their regional animus and refuse to hire 
similarly qualified individuals without running afoul of Title VII. 
In addition to Southerners, Americans living in the Appalachian region 
of the United States have also struggled with subnational employment 
discrimination.75 Although “Appalachian-Americans are not generally 
 
degree as many . . . other racial/ethnic groups . . . such as Jews, blacks, and Hispanics . . . they are 
nonetheless consistently stereotyped in a more negative manner than whites more generally”). 
72 KILLIAN, supra note 70, at 108-09.  
73 See Lori Peek, They Call It “Katrina Fatigue”: Displaced Families and Discrimination in Colorado, 
in DISPLACED: LIFE IN THE KATRINA DIASPORA 31, 39-40 (Lynn Weber & Lori Peek eds., 2012). 
74 Id. at 40. Accents are “often derivative of race and national origin” and evoke “a plethora of 
both conscious and unconscious prejudices.” Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrim-
ination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1348, 1351 (1991); see 
also id. at 1351 (“When Jimmy Carter was president, many Northerners admitted that they had a 
hard time believing that someone with a Georgia accent could be intelligent or well educated.”); 
Rachel Rodriguez, Regional Accents Thrive in U.S.—But Is That a Good Thing?, CNN (Sept. 29, 
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/29/living/american-accents-ireport (explaining that southern or 
western accents “are among the most stigmatized in the United States”).  
75 See generally Elizabeth E. Heilman, Hoosiers, Hicks, and Hayseeds: The Controversial Place of 
Marginalized Ethnic Whites in Multicultural Education, 37 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 67 (2004) 
(providing a detailed account of discrimination, including employment discrimination, against 
Appalachians); Matthew H. Walker, Comment, Discrimination Based on National Origin and 
Ancestry: How the Goals of Equality Have Failed to Address the Pervasive Stereotyping of the Appalachian 
Tradition, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 335, 337 (2013) (detailing the employment discrimination that 
Appalachians have faced throughout history and arguing that “Appalachians are a distinct cultural 
group that have experienced a history of oppression and marginalization similar to that endured by 
racial and ethnic minorities such as the African, Native, and Mexican Americans”).  
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discussed in multicultural textbooks or thought of as a distinct cultural 
group . . . they exhibit major cultural differences when compared to the 
common social construct of ‘white America.’”76 Appalachians “have their 
own music, history, art, tradition, literature, dialect, religious beliefs, and 
ideas of ecology, justice, education and health.”77 More so than in other 
regions, “[t]he family, or ‘kin’, as a working unit, is an important part of 
Appalachian-America,” and “Appalachians have a strong sense of community, 
even when in urban settings.”78 Unlike Northeastern-Americans, Appalachians 
frown upon competitiveness and boasting—“people are expected to play 
down their achievements and not act as if they are ‘above’ everyone else.”79 
Additionally, “Appalachians have distinct speech patterns, usually regarded 
as ‘slow drawls’” and use “colloquial words such as: ain’t (is not), y’all (you 
all), y’uns (you ones or you guys), warsher (washing machine, note the ‘r’), 
[and] tater (potato).”80 
Stereotypes of Appalachians pervade American society, particularly in 
the media. Americans frequently refer to Appalachians as “white trash” and 
“trailer trash” and associate Appalachians with “ignorance, incest, inferior 
genetics, [and] poor hygiene.”81 According to one nineteenth-century 
commentator, Appalachians are “the laziest two legged animals that walk 
erect on the face of the Earth. Even their motions are slow, and their speech 
a sickening drawl . . . [They show] a natural stupidity or dullness of intellect 
that almost surpasses belief.”82  
These odious stereotypes of Appalachians as unintelligent hillbillies 
have had particularly adverse effects on Appalachians in the employment 
context. For example, “[a] twang in the voice, a quirky expression like ‘I 
reckon,’ [and] a taste for banjo music . . . can lead to many other assump-
tions: This person is not smart, this person won’t show up on time, this 
person’s temper is likely to be quick.”83 As a result, many Appalachians that 
moved to big cities in search of jobs84 were discriminated against by 
 
76 Sizemore, supra note 4. 
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 See Heilman, supra note 75, at 68-69 (quoting an 1860 ethnography of the South and ex-
plaining that such negative social opinions about Appalachians have “carried on consistently from 
colonial days to the present”) (alteration in original).  
83 Judy Pasternak, Column One: Bias Blights Life Outside Appalachia, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
1994, at A1.  
84 See KATHRYN M. BORMAN, ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN COMMUNITIES AND SCHOOLS: 
RECOGNIZING AND BUILDING ON STRENGTHS 71 (1998) (“[T]he influx of Appalachian people 
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employers who either consciously or subconsciously connoted the employee’s 
regional origin with ignorance.85 Employment discrimination against 
Appalachians still persists in many cities.86 A study in 1998 found that the 
“promise of good employment remains elusive for urban Appalachian youth 
whose repertoire of skills and behaviors places them at odds with employers’ 
biases toward those who display a more ‘appropriate’ demeanor.”87  
To combat this pervasive employment discrimination, Cincinnati 
“adopt[ed] the nation’s only human rights ordinance banning discrimination 
against Appalachians.”88 Outside of Ohio, however, protection of Appalachians 
from subnational employment discrimination is virtually nonexistent. As 
with Southerners, an Appalachian discriminated against because of her 
regional origin cannot make out a prima facie case of national origin 
discrimination under Title VII where the employer hired a different American, 
but non-Appalachian, employee.89 Thus, even though “Appalachians are 
statistically one of the most exploited and marginalised groups in Ameri-
ca,”90 they are frequently left without recourse under Title VII simply based 
upon a narrow interpretation of the term “national origin.” 
Whether the discrimination is North versus South, East Coast versus 
West Coast,91 Northern California versus Southern California,92 Alaskans 
 
from rural areas to Midwestern cities following World War II was nearly as great as Irish and 
Italian migration in the late 19th century and [was] in sheer numbers much greater than the 
current migration of Asians to U.S. shores . . . .”).  
85 See id. at 73-74 (“[N]either cultural differences nor migrant status alone or together ac-
count for this outcome. Rather, Appalachians are excluded in order to reduce competition for jobs 
‘reserved’ for native, non-Appalachian whites.”). 
86 See id. at 73 (noting that discrimination “persists in the current job market for urban Appa-
lachians” in cities such as “Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati” which have 
large urban Appalachian populations).  
87 See id. at 74 (observing that “[e]mployers desire docile, ‘responsible’ workers who do not 
have strong obligations to kin, the problems associated with young families of their own, and 
whose approach to life is less spontaneous and engaged than that of many urban Appalachi-
an . . . youths”). 
88 Pasternak, supra note 83.  
89 See De Volld v. Bailar, 568 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining that whatever motives 
an employer “may have had in choosing between two people of the same ethnic origin, discrimina-
tion cannot have been among them”). 
90 Sizemore, supra note 4.  
91 See, e.g., Linton Weeks, After Quake, A New Round of Coastal Rivalry Erupts, NPR (Aug. 25, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/25/139942033/after-quake-a-new-round-of-coastal-rivalry-erupts 
(describing the rivalry between the East Coast and the West Coast, which may be rooted in 
cultural differences between the coasts).  
92 See THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATE: NORTHERN CALIFORNIA VS. SOUTHERN CALI-
FORNIA, at xi ( Jon Winokur ed., 2004) (illustrating the cultural clash between northern California 
and southern California, with “San Franciscans” looking down on “Angelenos” as inferior). 
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versus Native-Alaskans,93 or the rest of the nation versus Appalachians, 
various regional differences in the United States have culminated in em-
ployment discrimination. By incorrectly assuming that all Americans share 
a homogeneous national origin, Espinoza’s narrow definition of national 
origin fails to account for “intraethnic cultural distinctions [that] often 
result in prejudice, discrimination, ethnic segregation and even attempts at 
ethnocide.”94 
C. Title VII’s Inconsistent Treatment of Protected Classes 
In addition to erroneously assuming that nations are homogeneous, the 
current definition of national origin does not explicitly affirm the Supreme 
Court’s recognition in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. that 
unlawful discrimination under Title VII can occur within a protected class.95 
In Oncale, the Supreme Court upheld a claim for same-sex sexual harass-
ment, explaining that “nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of 
discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the 
defendant . . . are of the same sex.”96 As the Supreme Court explained, “it 
would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one 
definable group will not discriminate against other members of their 
group.”97 Similarly, “in the related context of racial discrimination in the 
workplace [the Court has] rejected any conclusive presumption that an 
employer will not discriminate against members of his own race.”98  
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Oncale applies equally to national 
origin as to sex and race. Just like sex and race discrimination can occur 
among individuals that share the same gender and skin color, respectively, 
national origin discrimination can—and does—occur among individuals that 
share the same country of origin. Where both employer and employee trace 
 
93 See ALASKA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACISM’S 
FRONTIER: THE UNTOLD STORY OF DISCRIMINATION AND DIVISION IN ALASKA 32 (2002), 
available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/ak0402/ak02.pdf (quoting an Alaskan economist who 
stated, “The share of Alaska Natives employed in virtually every industry in [Alaska] is less than 
their share of the population. . . . [A] 50 percent increase in Native workers would be necessary to 
create parity in job holdings. In some occupations requiring higher education, a 200 percent 
increase would be necessary for parity.” (alterations in original)). 
94 Cruz, supra note 15, at 164. 
95 See 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (“Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ 
protects men as well as women, and in the related context of racial discrimination in the workplace 
we have rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against 
members of his own race.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
96 Id. at 79 (first alteration in original).  
97 Id. at 78 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)). 
98 Id. 
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their origins to the United States, such subnational discrimination typically 
occurs due to the deep-rooted regional differences that have long existed 
within the nation. If this issue comes before the Supreme Court, the Court 
should extend its recognition that discrimination can occur within a pro-
tected class to national origin as well. Doing so would not only render Title 
VII internally consistent, but also ensure that Title VII covers the many 
instances of national origin discrimination that arise due to regional differ-
ences within the United States.  
III.  BROADENING THE DEFINITION OF NATIONAL ORIGIN TO 
ENCOMPASS SUBNATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
To account for discrimination within national origin groups, both the 
EEOC and courts have, over time, expanded the definition of national 
origin to focus on place—rather than country—of origin. As a result, they 
have permitted employees to trace their origins to subnational groups in 
foreign countries. However, they have refused to recognize claims where 
employees have traced their origins to subnational groups within the United 
States.  
A. The EEOC’s Expanded Definition of National Origin 
Recognizing the problem with the presumption that nations are homoge-
neous, the EEOC formally expanded its interpretation of national origin in 
1980 by amending its regulations “to replace ‘country of origin’ with ‘place 
of origin.’”99 The EEOC did so “in order to discourage ‘reference to a 
sovereign nation.’”100 Under this expanded definition, place of origin 
includes not just countries and former countries, but also places that have 
“never been a country, but [are] closely associated with a group of people 
who share a common language, culture, ancestry, and/or other similar social 
characteristics.”101 As a result, the EEOC has deemed national origin to 
include “smaller ethnic groups, such as Kurds or Roma (Gypsies),” as well as 
“larger ethnic groups.”102  
Implicit in the EEOC’s expanded definition is a recognition that the 
term “national” in national origin should not be read literally as “of a 
 
99 Kanaji v. Child. Hosp. of Phila., 276 F. Supp. 2d 399, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing Guide-
lines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,632, 85,633 (Dec. 29, 1980) 
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1606)).  
100 Id. (citing Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg. at 
85,633).  
101 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 622:0002 (2002).  
102 Id. § 622:0003. 
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nation.” Rather, the EEOC has read “national” more broadly to include 
other ethnic and geographic groups. For example, the EEOC deems 
national origin to include Hispanics and Arabs, even though neither can be 
traced to a single nation.  
Although the EEOC has embraced multinational discrimination within 
its definition of national origin, it has failed to account for subnational 
discrimination, even though subnational discrimination is equally consistent 
with the EEOC’s definition. According to the EEOC, a national origin 
group “is a group of people sharing a common language, culture, ancestry, 
and/or other similar social characteristics.”103 This definition is compatible 
with the notion of subnational discrimination because subnational or 
regional groups are even more likely to share common language, culture, 
ancestry, and/or other similar characteristics than a nation as a whole.104  
B. Courts’ Expanded Definition of National  
Origin Over Time 
Like the EEOC, courts have also gradually expanded their definition of 
national origin in order to clarify that national origin is not governed by 
principles of sovereignty. However, courts have been forced to play upon 
nuances in language and subtle technicalities to account for subnational 
discrimination without contradicting Espinoza. They have achieved this by 
interpreting “country of origin” to subsume “place of origin” as defined by 
the EEOC.  
The first decision to raise the issue of subnational discrimination following 
Espinoza was Roach v. Dresser Industrial Valve & Instrument Division.105 In 
Roach, an American-born, Louisiana resident brought a national origin 
discrimination claim against his American employer, claiming that he was 
fired because of his “Acadian” or “Cajun” descent.106 Although Acadia is 
not—nor ever was—a sovereign country, the court upheld the plaintiff ’s 
claim for national origin discrimination, concluding that “since Acadians 
historically came from the former French colony of ‘Acadia,’ today’s Nova 
Scotia, this geographic link [was] enough regardless of whether such 
 
103 Id. § 622:0002. 
104 See Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal 
Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 73 (2009) (“[N]ational 
origin discrimination is less likely to consist of discrimination motivated by the fact that a person 
or her ancestors came from a particular country, and it is much more likely to consist of discrimi-
nation based on ethnic characteristics with regional associations.”); see also supra text accompanying 
note 61. 
105 494 F. Supp. 215, 218 (W.D. La. 1980). 
106 See id. at 216 (discussing the definition and history of the Acadian people). 
  
2014] The Divided States of America 669 
 
territory ever possessed political sovereignty.”107 Rooting its decision in 
Title VII’s underlying purpose, the court explained that “[d]istinctions 
between citizens solely because of their ancestors are odious to a free people 
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality, and we 
decline to accept the argument that litigation of this sort should be gov-
erned by the principles of sovereignty.”108 Thus, the court began paving the 
way toward recognizing regional discrimination within the United States.  
Eight years later, the Ninth Circuit agreed that country of origin is not 
limited by principles of national sovereignty. In Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, 
Inc., an employee claimed that his employer chose not to promote him 
because of his Serbian ancestry and instead promoted a less senior employ-
ee.109 In defense, the employer claimed that the plaintiff was not a member 
of a protected class under the national origin provision because Serbians 
were “simply [an] ethnic group[] residing in the [then existing] nation of 
Yugoslavia.”110 The court held that Serbians constitute a protected class 
within Title VII, explaining that “Title VII cannot be read to limit ‘countries’ 
to those with modern boundaries, or to require their existence for a certain 
time length before it will prohibit discrimination.”111 Taking into account 
the legislative history and Supreme Court precedent, “[u]nless historical 
reality is ignored, the term ‘national origin’ must include countries no 
longer in existence.”112  
Roach and Pejic support recognizing subnational discrimination claims 
for two reasons. First, the cases recognized that just because a country lacks 
political sovereignty or no longer exists does not mean it falls outside of the 
scope of “national origin” within Title VII. This implies that Southerners 
residing in what was formerly the Confederate States of America should be 
able to sue on the basis of national origin discrimination, even though the 
Confederacy no longer exists and was never considered a separate, sovereign 
nation.113 Second, the court in Pejic recognized, in the context of Yugoslavia, 
 
107 Cruz, supra note 15, at 178. 
108 Roach, 494 F. Supp. at 218.  
109 See 840 F.2d 667, 669-70 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing the employee’s allegations that he 
was bypassed for a promotion after his employer—whose niece was married to a Croatian—
discovered that the employee was of Serbian ancestry). 
110 Id. at 673.  
111 Id. 
112 Id. (citing Roach, 494 F. Supp. at 218).  
113 Although litigation regarding the standing of the Confederacy is sparse, the Supreme 
Court has refused to recognize the Confederacy as a sovereign nation in various cases involving 
the doctrine of state succession. See, e.g., Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 191-92 (1877) (“Whatever 
de facto character may be ascribed to the Confederate government consists solely in the fact, that it 
maintained a contest with the United States for nearly four years, and dominated for that period 
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that subnational tension can exist within countries. This subnational and 
interethnic strife between Serbians and Croatians ultimately resulted in the 
destruction of Yugoslavia as a unified nation in 1991.114 Since the court 
recognized a region of Yugoslavia as a valid “national origin,” one would 
logically assume courts would do the same with respect to regions of the 
United States that have experienced similar subnational strife.  
Consistent with Pejic, courts continued to broaden the interpretation of 
national origin in the 1990s. In Janko v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 
an employee sued, claiming that her employer terminated her “because she 
is a Gypsy.”115 Although Gypsies do not come from one particular nation, 
the court held that including Gypsies within the meaning of “national 
origin” was consistent with Title VII’s purpose: “to prevent the majority 
people from discriminating against other people based upon ethnic distinc-
tions commonly recognized at the time of the discrimination.”116  
Similarly, in Metoyer v. Kansas, an employee claimed she was “fired be-
cause of her Creole national origin in violation of Title VII.”117 Although the 
plaintiff ultimately failed to establish a prima facie case, the court recog-
nized that Creole could constitute a protected national origin.118 As the 
court explained, “[u]nder the flexible McDonnell Douglas proof scheme, the 
‘membership’ requirement of the prima facie case must not be taken too 
literally in cases where a plaintiff ’s connection to a national group is in 
dispute.”119 In other words, courts should afford plaintiffs the benefit of the 
doubt in national origin discrimination cases. So long as plaintiffs can trace 
their origin to some subnational group that has been subject to discrimina-
tion, they fall within a protected class for purposes of national origin 
discrimination.  
 
over a large extent of territory. When its military forces were overthrown, it utterly perished, and 
with it all its enactments.”). 
114 See Svetozar Stojanovic, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 337, 339 
(1995) (explaining that “Yugoslavia emerged, disappeared, and rose again in two world 
wars . . . marked by inter-national, inter-religious, civil, fratricidal, and even genocidal conflicts”); 
see also Chuck Sudetic, Yugoslav Breakup Gains Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1991, at L3 
(describing how Yugoslavia “tumbled further toward complete disintegration” when the ethnically 
mixed republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina applied for recognition as an independent state, 
following the lead of Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia).  
115 704 F. Supp. 1531, 1531 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
116 Id. at 1532 (citing Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987)).  
117 874 F. Supp. 1198, 1200 (D. Kan. 1995). 
118 See id. at 1202-03 (explaining that the term Creole denotes a person of mixed French or 
Spanish ancestry, which suffices as a national origin).  
119 Id. (italics added) (quoting Gilbert v. Babbitt, 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 43,165, at 
80,520 (D.D.C. 1993)). 
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Finally, the courts’ gradual expansion of the definition of national origin 
is also evident in their treatment of employment discrimination suits 
brought by Native Americans. In Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agricul-
tural Improvement & Power District, the plaintiff alleged that “because he is a 
Hopi and not a Navajo, he was not considered for a position with a private 
employer operating a facility on the Navajo reservation.”120 In upholding 
the plaintiff ’s claim, the court held that because “different Indian tribes 
were at one time considered nations . . . discrimination on the basis of tribal 
affiliation can give rise to a ‘national origin’ claim under Title VII.”121 
However, the Ninth Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court “has in 
more recent times recognized the erosion of the Indian tribes’ ‘nation’ 
status.”122 As a result, “even if the various tribes never enjoyed formal 
‘nation’ status . . . discrimination based on one’s ancestor’s ‘place of origin’ is 
sufficient to state a cause of action.”123  
The Dawavendewa decision is notable because it addressed both the narrow 
and broad definitions of national origin that courts have read into Espinoza. 
On the one hand, Native American tribes retain a degree of sovereignty as 
domestic dependent nations.124 To the extent that this limited sovereignty is 
enough to constitute a “nation,” as suggested in Dawavendewa, Native 
Americans would fall within Espinoza’s narrow definition of national origin. 
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in Dawavendewa was careful not to 
base its holding solely on Native American’s quasi-sovereign status. Rather, 
the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that even if Native American tribes were 
never considered sovereign nations, both “case law and the regulations 
interpreting Title VII” have made clear that discrimination based on “‘place 
of origin’ is sufficient to state a cause of action.”125 Thus, even with regard to 
Native Americans, courts have emphasized “place of origin” to clarify that 
Espinoza does not limit national origin to territories with actual sovereignty.126  
 
120 154 F.3d 1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Alison Etheredge, Native Americans (explaining 
that the Indian Preferences exemption to Title VII permits employers on or near Native American 
preservations to give preferential treatment to Native Americans, but does not specify whether 
such employers may give preferential treatment based on membership in a particular tribe), in 
1998–1999 Annual Survey of Title VII Decisions, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 317, at 344, 346 (2000). 
121 Dawavendewa, 154 F.3d at 1120.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (“[I]t may well be doubted 
whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, 
with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be 
denominated domestic dependent nations.”).  
125 Dawavendewa, 154 F.3d at 1120.  
126 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari on the issue of whether national origin includes 
tribal affiliation. See Onyiah v. St. Cloud State Univ., 684 F.3d 711, 718-19 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. 
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C. Courts’ Refusal to Recognize Claims of Subnational  
Discrimination Within the United States 
Although courts’ broader reading of national origin as “place of origin” 
should also cover regional discrimination within the United States, courts 
have refused to extend the definition thus far. Rather, courts have continued 
to treat the United States as a homogeneous place of origin. As a result, 
plaintiffs may bring national origin claims against their employers based on 
subnational differences only when those differences stem from outside the 
United States or from Native American tribes.  
 One of the first strictly “regional” discrimination cases was Bronson v. 
Board of Education of the City School District of Cincinnati.127 In this case, the 
plaintiffs claimed that they were discriminated against on the basis of their 
Appalachian national origin.128 Although plaintiffs sued under Title VI 
rather than Title VII, the court looked to the Civil Rights Act as a whole to 
interpret the meaning of national origin and found that Appalachians do 
not constitute a protected class.129  
At its core, Bronson is indistinguishable from Pejic, where the court upheld 
a claim for national origin discrimination based upon the plaintiff ’s “Serbian” 
descent, even though Serbia was not a sovereign nation at the time. In both 
cases, the employer and employee were from the United States. Further, in 
both cases, the discrimination at issue was regional—a region of Yugoslavia 
in Pejic versus a region of the United States in Bronson. The court, however, 
treated the cases differently because, unlike the plaintiff in Pejic, the plain-
tiff in Bronson could not trace his regional origin to a territory outside of the 
United States. As the court explained, “[t]here is no indication that ‘national 
origin’ was intended to include . . . groups such as Appalachians who do not 
possess a national origin distinguishable from that of other citizens of the 
United States.”130 Thus, the court in Bronson made the unrealistic assump-
tion that “America” constitutes a homogeneous national origin.  
Courts have followed Bronson’s lead in rejecting Title VII national origin 
discrimination claims stemming solely from regional differences in the 
United States. In Storey v. Burns International Security Services, an employee 
brought a national origin discrimination suit, claiming that he was fired 
 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1502 (2013) (dismissing as time-barred plaintiff ’s salary discrimination claims 
regarding tribal affiliation, in which plaintiff claimed he was discriminated against because he was 
from the Igbo ethnic tribe in Nigeria, whereas his employer was from the Yoruba tribe).  
127 550 F. Supp. 941 (S.D. Ohio 1982). 
128 Id. at 944.  
129 Id. at 959. 
130 Id.  
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from his position as a security guard because he was a “Confederate Southern-
American.”131 Even though Confederate Southern-Americans share a 
common culture, the court ultimately held that Confederate Southern-
American is not a legitimate national origin for Title VII purposes.132 
Elaborating on the majority’s reasoning, the concurring opinion explained 
that “[w]here one cannot trace ancestry to a nation outside of the United 
States, a former regional or political group within the United States, such as 
the Confederacy, does not constitute a basis for a valid national origin 
classification.”133  
In Fowler v. Visiting Nurse Service of New York, the employee, a Southern 
African-American woman, claimed that she was fired because of both her 
race and her Southern national origin.134 The court rejected her national 
origin claim, explaining that “regional differences among the people of this 
country do not create protected classes.”135 Failing to provide an explanation 
for why “Southern” does not constitute a valid national origin under Title 
VII, the court instead simply concluded that “the state or region of the 
United States where plaintiff was raised is irrelevant to her national origin 
claim.”136 The court also made explicit its assumption that America is a 
homogeneous national origin, explaining that because the plaintiff is 
“American,” “she must show that she was mistreated as compared to non-
Americans”137 to defeat summary judgment on her national origin claim.  
One of the most recent cases addressing the specific issue of regional 
discrimination was Vitalis v. Sun Constructors, Inc.138 In Vitalis, the plaintiff 
claimed that his employer—a “state-sider[]” from the United States main-
land—fired him because he was a “local resident[] of St. Croix.”139 Before 
 
131 390 F.3d 760, 761 (3d Cir. 2004). 
132 Id. at 765. 
133 Id. at 766 (Scirica, C.J., concurring). 
134 No. 06-4351, 2007 WL 3256129, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2007).  
135 Id. at *4. 
136 Id.; see also Langadinos v. Appalachian Sch. of Law, No. 05-0039, 2005 WL 2333460, at *8 
(W.D. Va. Sept. 25, 2005) (deciding without providing further explanation that, in the context of a 
discrimination complaint against the plaintiff ’s school, northeastern background is not a protected 
trait under Title VII); Williams v. Frank, 757 F. Supp. 112, 120 (D. Mass. 1991) (concluding that 
“Southerness is not a protected trait” under Title VII), aff ’d, 959 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1992).  
137 Fowler, 2007 WL 3256129, at *4.  
138 481 F. App’x 718 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Prevost v. Islands Mech. Contractor, Inc., No. 
2008-110, 2013 WL 1091187, at *7 (D.V.I. Mar. 15, 2013) (relying on Vitalis to disallow an argument 
suggesting that “locals”—residents of St. Croix—constitute a protected class based on their 
national origin); Gottschalk v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 12-4531, 2013 WL 557010, at *8 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (dismissing a national origin discrimination claim based on the plaintiff ’s 
Hawaiian origin because “[n]ational origin discrimination does not encompass discrimination 
against someone because of their origin in a particular state or region of the United States”).  
139 Vitalis, 481 F. App’x at 720-21.  
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addressing the merits of the claim, the Third Circuit explained that although 
Espinoza defined national origin as country of origin, “[i]n some cases . . . courts 
have been willing to expand the concept of ‘national origin’ to include 
claims from persons such as [C]ajuns or [S]erbs based upon the unique 
historical, political and/or social circumstances of a given region.”140 Yet, 
even under this broad definition, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that 
“all of the local residents of St. Croix share a ‘unique historical, political 
and/or social circumstance.’”141 As a result, the court dismissed the claim, 
holding that “local residents of St. Croix do not constitute a protected class 
based on their national origin.”142  
As evident from the patchwork of case law confronting the issue, the 
state of the law with respect to subnational discrimination is mixed. On the 
one hand, courts have interpreted national origin more broadly as “place of 
origin” on the grounds that Espinoza’s use of the phrase “country of origin” 
might incorrectly imply a reference to a sovereign nation. In doing so, the 
courts have recognized claims where an employee’s subnational origin—
Acadian, Creole, Gypsy, Serbian, Hopi—differs from the employer’s 
American national origin.  
On the other hand, courts have simultaneously failed to extend this 
analysis to instances where an employer and employee are both “American,” 
but differ based on their divergent regional origins within the United 
States. As a result, some of the most potent forms of employment discrimi-
nation within the United States stemming from subnational differences 
have been allowed to persist based solely on the flawed assumption that 
America constitutes a unified place of origin.  
IV. REINTERPRETING NATIONAL ORIGIN  
UNDER TITLE VII 
The American legal system must acknowledge that homogeneous national 
origins do not exist. Regional identity provides a “sense of family and 
historical identity that the nation-state often cannot produce.”143 While the 
state can provide common legal and political structures, regional origin 
often offers “stronger bases for group affinity stemming from a distinctive 
common religion, historical experience, and, usually, ancestral language.”144 
 
140 Id. at 721 (quoting Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 762 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
141 Id. 
142 Id.  
143 Cruz, supra note 15, at 163 n.11 (citing Brian E. Porter, Concepts of Nationalism in History, in 
GLOBAL CONVULSIONS 93, 108 (Winston A. Van Horne ed., 1997)).  
144 Id. 
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As a result, “national origin discrimination is less likely to consist of dis-
crimination motivated by the fact that a person or her ancestors came from 
a particular country, and it is much more likely to consist of discrimination 
based on ethnic characteristics with regional associations.”145 
By failing to account for subnational differences within the United 
States, Title VII permits employers to discriminate on the basis of regional 
differences, touting a shared “American” origin as a shield. Permitting such 
discrimination contradicts the purpose of Title VII, which was intended to 
protect employees from discrimination on the basis of arbitrary factors 
unrelated to an employee’s job performance. Just like race and gender, 
subnational origin is irrelevant to an employee’s job qualifications. Further, 
subnational employment discrimination inflicts the same harms as race and 
gender discrimination: “stigmatization, forced assimilation and denial of 
cultural expression.”146 To redress these harms, Title VII should be broad-
ened to include protection for the divergent, regional cultures that exist in 
the United States.  
A. “Ethnic Trait” Discrimination 
One possible solution to account for subnational differences is for Con-
gress to amend Title VII to include the prohibition of ethnicity discrimina-
tion.147 The term ethnicity consists of “ethnic traits that may include, but are 
not limited to: race, national origin, ancestry, language, religion, shared 
history, traditions, values, and symbols.”148 Under this approach, a plaintiff 
could bring a Title VII claim based on her ethnicity without having to trace it 
to either a particular country or geographic subregion. While such an approach 
would be a step in the right direction, it is problematic for two reasons.  
First, amending Title VII to cover discrimination based on “ethnic 
traits” without any geographic limitation whatsoever would render national 
origin overly broad and amorphous. As scholars proposing this amendment 
concede, ethnicity is difficult to define because it incorporates a variety of 
different traits.149 “Ethnic identity” can refer to any combination of traits, 
including origin, solidarity, personal integrity, cultural uniqueness, and 
 
145 Oliveri, supra note 104, at 73. 
146 Cruz, supra note 15, at 186. 
147 See Perea, supra note 13, at 860 (arguing that “Congress should add terms [to Title VII] 
protecting against discrimination because of ‘ancestry’ and ‘ethnic traits’”); see also Cruz, supra note 
15, at 180-81 (criticizing Title VII’s failure to remedy intraethnic discrimination and recognize 
possible cultural heterogeneity across national origin groups).  
148 Perea, supra note 13, at 833.  
149 Id.  
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territorial integrity, among countless others.150 Further, ethnicity is a 
constantly evolving concept. “Just as ethnic groups evolve through interac-
tion with other distinct ethnicities, ethnic groups also change because of 
internal cultural subgroupings. In a sense, ethnicity serves as the forum in 
which cultural dialectics interact, not merely between the ethnic group and 
outsiders, but also within the group itself.”151 
Given the evolving nature of ethnicity and the fact that it evades clear 
definition, amending Title VII to include ethnic traits would open the 
floodgates of litigation and leave the courts struggling to ascertain the 
statute’s limits. Facing conflicting claims over which traits are essential to a 
group’s identity, courts would be left to embark on an ethnographic immer-
sion that could not be attained by simply reviewing court filings, exhibits, 
and expert testimony. Moreover, making such a judgment would run the 
risk that “recognizing cultural rights would . . . solidify one version of the 
group’s identity over others and bolster the notion that groups have essences,”152 
thereby codifying the boundaries of ethnic identities into precedent.  
Second, amending Title VII to protect against discrimination based on 
ethnic traits would lead to inherent overlap within the statute. Ethnicity is 
comprised of various traits, such as race and religion,153 which are already 
separately actionable under Title VII. Thus, amending Title VII to include 
“ethnic traits” would serve to conflate national origin with the other pro-
tected classes delineated in the statute. This would contradict the legislative 
history of Title VII, which makes clear that Congress viewed national origin 
as its own protected class, distinguishable from both race and religion. As 
Congressman Dent stated during a floor debate on Title VII: “National 
origin . . . has nothing to do with color, religion, or the race of an individual.”154  
An ethnic traits amendment would also lead to overlap within the statute 
because Title VII already covers trait discrimination when the trait at issue 
is used as a proxy for national origin. For example, Title VII case law has 
established that denying an individual employment because of the individual’s 
manner of speaking or accent constitutes unlawful discrimination where the 
 
150 EUGEEN E. ROOSENS, CREATING ETHNICITY: THE PROCESS OF ETHNOGENESIS 19 
(1989).  
151 Cruz, supra note 15, at 171. 
152 Roberto J. Gonzalez, Note, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in Disparate 
Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2198 (2003). 
153 See supra text accompanying note 148. 
154 110 Cong. Rec. 2549 (1964); see also Perea, supra note 13, at 818. Although Congressman 
Dent’s statement is an exaggeration—since there will inevitably be some degree of overlap 
between protected classes—it makes clear that Congress viewed national origin as distinguishable 
from both race and religion, warranting its own independent protection.  
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accent marks the employee as being from another country.155 Similarly, both 
the EEOC and courts have held that English-only rules in the workplace 
violate Title VII’s prohibition against national origin discrimination where 
English is not a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).156 Since traits 
such as language and accent are already actionable when they are used as 
proxies for national origin, an ethnic traits amendment would be unhelpful 
in addressing the shortcomings of Title VII’s national origin provision.  
In defense of the ethnic traits approach, scholars counter that proxies are 
insufficient because courts differ widely on which traits can serve as proxies 
for a protected category and on the required degree of correlation between 
the trait and the protected class.157 Therefore, they argue, discrimination 
based on ethnic traits should be prohibited directly, rather than only 
indirectly when such traits are used as proxies for national origin.158  
Although proxies require courts to make nuanced determinations based 
on correlations, they have more potential for uniform application than a 
direct prohibition on ethnic trait discrimination. Since Title VII was 
enacted, courts have consistently made difficult decisions based on correla-
tions. For example, in all disparate impact cases, courts must determine 
whether the correlation between an employment practice and its statistically 
greater impact on a protected class leads to an inference of discrimination.159 
Similarly, in the context of BFOQs, courts must determine whether a 
protected trait is sufficiently correlated with job performance to qualify as a 
valid BFOQ.160 Thus, although complexities are inherent in using correlations, 
 
155 See STEVEN C. KAHN ET AL., LEGAL GUIDE TO HUMAN RESOURCES § 2.01(9), at 2-5 
(1994) (explaining that discrimination on the basis of “accent” could be considered national origin 
discrimination where the accent is also a proxy for national origin, unless the employer can show 
that the accent interferes with the employee’s ability to perform the job). 
156 See id.; Smith, supra note 14, at 21.  
157 Perea, supra note 13, at 852. 
158 Id. at 853. 
159 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 (1977) (explaining that 
while the disparity between 3.7% (the percentage of black teachers hired by the school) and 5.7% 
(the percentage of black teachers in the county) would not be enough to give rise to an inference 
of discrimination, a disparity between 3.7% and 15.4% (the percentage of black teachers in the city) 
might be); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 320-21 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that the 
statistical disparity between men and women in commission jobs was not enough to lead to an 
inference of discriminatory intent because Sears offered evidence of nondiscriminatory explana-
tions for the disparity, such as the fact that women were simply not interested in commission 
jobs). 
160 See, e.g., Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414-17 (1985) (holding that an em-
ployer may use a protected trait as a legitimate proxy for job qualification “by proving that it is 
‘impossible or highly impractical’ to deal with the . . . employees on an individualized basis” and 
noting as an example that an employer could show that “some members of the discriminated-
against class possess a trait precluding safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained 
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courts have dealt with these issues in various areas of employment discrimi-
nation law and could do the same with respect to national origin.161  
B. Regional Discrimination 
In order to both account for discrimination within the United States and 
provide the courts with manageable limits, national origin discrimination 
should be reinterpreted to include regional discrimination. Under this 
proposal, a plaintiff would need to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the employer discriminated against her because of her “place of 
origin,” which would include regions within the United States. This would 
permit a plaintiff to file a cause of action even where an employer and 
employee are both American, so long as the plaintiff asserts that she was 
discriminated against as a result of her being from a distinct region of the 
United States.  
To make out a prima facie case, plaintiffs would have to show that the 
region of the United States where they are from has a unique history, 
culture, and political or social circumstance that is distinguishable from 
others in the United States. This inquiry would entail many of the same 
factors considered in determining ethnicity, but unlike the ethnic traits 
approach, the inquiry here would remain geographically circumscribed.  
Embracing regional discrimination within the meaning of national 
origin would have four main benefits. First, a regional discrimination 
approach would affirm, consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition in 
Oncale, that unlawful discrimination can occur within a protected class.162 
Just as courts have recognized that sex discrimination can occur between 
individuals of the same sex163 and that race discrimination can occur between 
 
by means other than knowledge of the applicant’s membership in the class” (citations omitted)); 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (holding that the employer failed to produce 
sufficient evidence correlating its height and weight requirements with the requisite amount of 
strength it thought essential to good job performance).  
161 Even if the complexities associated with using proxies seem too burdensome for courts to 
grapple with, the issues posed by a direct prohibition of ethnic trait discrimination would be far 
more onerous. Under such an approach, courts would have to trace identified traits to a notion of 
ethnicity that is inherently vague and lacks any identifiable boundaries. Another approach is 
needed that will account for the existence of subnational discrimination and provide courts with 
external limits.  
162 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining that Title VII also protects against 
intraracial discrimination in the workplace).  
163 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
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individuals of the same race,164 the courts must also recognize that national 
origin discrimination can occur between individuals from the same country 
of origin.  
Second, regional discrimination falls within the literal meaning of “place 
of origin” as embraced by the EEOC and courts following Espinoza.165 
Although courts have refused to extend the definition this far, there is no 
logical reason to recognize national origin claims based on subnational 
differences outside the United States (e.g., Serbian, Acadian), but not 
subnational differences within the United States (e.g., Appalachian). In fact, 
if place of origin means what courts have said it means—that, after Espinoza, 
national origin is not contingent on sovereignty—then this would favor 
including regions of the United States within the meaning of national origin.  
Third, recognizing regional discrimination comports with the overarching 
purpose of Title VII, which seeks to remove artificial bars to employment 
based on immutable characteristics.166 Like any other national origin, being 
born in a particular region of the United States has no inherent relation to 
one’s ability to perform a job and is completely outside an individual’s 
control. There is no reason why employers should be permitted to discrimi-
nate against qualified employees based solely on regional stereotypes, 
simply because those employees cannot trace their regional origin to 
territories outside the United States.  
Finally, a regional origin approach would provide the courts with the 
objectively identifiable limits that are lacking in the ethnicity approach. By 
requiring a plaintiff to point to a particular geographic region of the United 
States and prove that this region has a distinct culture, a regional approach 
would help circumscribe what would otherwise be an unguided journey into 
the evolving and undefined concept of ethnicity. Although it would ulti-
mately be up to the courts to decide how expansively to read the term 
“region,” the presumption should be in favor of a narrower reading, including 
at least those regions of the United States in which there is a well-
documented history of regional animus (e.g., the South and Appalachia).167 
In this way, regional origin splits the difference between the restrictive 
 
164 See Walker v. Sec’y of Treasury, IRS, 713 F. Supp. 403, 406-08 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (recognizing 
a Title VII discrimination claim by a light-skinned black employee against her dark-skinned black 
supervisor); supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.  
165 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
166 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“What is required by Congress 
[through Title VII] is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment 
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible 
classification.”). 
167 See supra Section II.B. 
  
680 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 649 
 
definition of national origin in Espinoza and the virtually limitless definition 
posed by an ethnic traits approach. On the one hand, it recognizes that, 
consistent with Oncale, discrimination can occur within a national origin 
group, and it provides redress to the countless Americans that have faced 
discrimination in employment on the basis of subnational differences. On 
the other hand, it avoids rendering “national origin” so broad that courts 
will be flooded with claims of ethnic discrimination and forced to make 
controversial determinations of what ethnicity means for purposes of Tile VII. 
While a regional discrimination approach serves as a middle ground be-
tween two extreme approaches, it is not a perfect solution. Just as the 
national origin provision currently fails to account for differences within the 
United States, regional discrimination would inevitably fail to account for 
differences within certain regions of the United States. However, as a 
practical matter, the line must be drawn somewhere. Without some geo-
graphically imposed limitation, U.S. courts would be forced to delve into a 
complex ethnographic immersion.168 Until scholars develop a clear notion of 
what ethnicity is and a uniform approach to identify it, the regional dis-
crimination approach will remain the most viable solution to addressing the 
problem of subnational discrimination within the United States.  
CONCLUSION 
The problem of discrimination based on regional origin is deeply rooted 
in our nation’s history and persists today. Though some may believe that 
America is a singular, homogeneous nation, the reality is that our nation—like 
many others—is comprised of regional subgroups, each sharing a different 
history, culture, and dialect. For too long, discrimination among these Ameri-
can subgroups has been permitted based on the flawed assumption that 
nations are homogeneous. Although the EEOC and the courts have moved in 
the right direction by rejecting the focus on a sovereign nation and broaden-
ing national origin to include “place of origin,” they have not gone far enough.  
To fully account for the discrimination that occurs among Americans, 
Title VII must be interpreted to include regional discrimination. The courts 
should do so by extending “place of origin” one step further to include 
regional origin. While this proposal would not cover every distinct, subna-
tional group within the United States, it would cover the most pervasive 
and documented form of subnational discrimination, which continues to be 
 
168 See supra Section IV.A. 
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based on region.169 Further, using “region,” instead of “ethnic traits,” would 
ensure that national origin remains geographically circumscribed. Without 
this sort of geographic limitation, the floodgates of litigation would open, 
and the courts would be left struggling to define Title VII around a notion 
of ethnicity that is, by definition, amorphous and constantly evolving.  
The time has come to extend protection to the countless employees who 
have been denied employment opportunities simply because they are 
viewed as “Yankees,” “hillbillies,” “Confederates,” “redskins,” or “rednecks.” 
Until courts formally recognize that this form of subnational origin discrimi-
nation persists within the United States, the overarching goal of Title VII—to 
prevent arbitrary discrimination in employment—will remain unfulfilled. 
 
169 See Oliveri, supra note 104, at 73 (“[N]ational origin discrimination is less likely to consist 
of discrimination motivated by the fact that a person or her ancestors came from a particular 
country, and it is much more likely to consist of discrimination based on ethnic characteristics with 
regional associations.”). 
